WASHINGTON (Reuters) January 11,
2007 — Most Americans have lost hope and want to leave Iraq. Not
so George Bush. He is convinced that “victory” is not just
possible but essential, and that the Middle East can still be
refashioned by democracy.
On Wednesday, January 10th, Bush announced that he would send more than 20,000 extra troops to Iraq, mostly to help Iraqi forces in their new campaign to secure Baghdad. Some 4,000 of these troops are destined for the violent western province of Anbar. American units will be “embedded” within Iraqi formations to help them hold neighborhoods wrested from armed groups. The new military effort will be bolstered with economic, political and diplomatic measures. American commanders and officials will be given greater authority to spend money, a “reconstruction co-coordinator” will be appointed in Baghdad and the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, will be held firmly to a set of political “benchmarks."
Mr. Bush turned down bipartisan calls to woo Iran and Syria. Instead, he accused those countries of instigating the violence in Iraq. He confirmed the deployment of an extra carrier strike group and Patriot anti-missile batteries to the Middle East—a clear signal that he is not only willing to raise the stakes in Iraq, but is also giving himself the option of a military strike to halt Iran’s suspected quest for nuclear weapons. Friendly Arab governments were told it was in their own interests for America to succeed.
Reinforcing the American presence now would break the cycle of violence and “hasten the day our troops begin coming home” according to Mr. Bush. But he acknowledged he had made “mistakes”, accepted that more Americans were likely to die, and told his audience not to expect a “surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship."
In deciding to redouble the war effort, Mr. Bush now finds himself almost alone. General John Abizaid, the head of Central Command that oversees American strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, all but rejected the idea of a “surge” of forces two months ago. He told a Senate hearing that raising troop levels by 20,000 would have only a “temporary effect” on security and would delay the day Iraqi forces could take control. Mr.. Bush has always said he would defer to his military commanders, but this time he did not take their advice. Instead, he dismissed General Abizaid and reshuffled key figures in his Iraq team.
Mr. Bush also ignored the managed withdrawal advocated by the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan commission co-chaired by James Baker, a former secretary of state. The strategy he plumped for was surge, an idea proposed in a report by the American Enterprise Institute, a hawkish think-tank. This called for an even bigger surge of about 35,000 troops.
The critical terrain is Baghdad: Iraq’s most populous city, with 6m inhabitants of all sects. The Americans have long pursued an “oil-spot” strategy—establishing areas of stability that would, with time, expand. These tactics have had success in some areas, particularly rural towns. In Baghdad, though, any calm is short-lived. Last summer’s joint American-Iraqi operation, codenamed “Together Forward”, was followed by the most vicious round of killing yet seen in the city. With the promise of substantially more troops the idea is that American forces will not only clear neighborhoods of insurgents, but also stay behind and make sure that economic development follows immediately.
More American troops may or may not bring greater security. But they will offer more targets for insurgents to shoot at, and reinforce many Iraqis’ resentment of the occupation. More civilians could get killed, whether by error, carelessness or worse.
The surge, then, may be too small to make a decisive impact and yet too large for the American armed forces to bear. The tempo of troop rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan is already in breach of the Pentagon’s guidelines. Equipment is being lost in battle or worn out much faster than anticipated. A bigger army would help, but it will take years to recruit and train new combat units.
Mr. Bush’s plan is to create some “breathing space”, bring down the violence to a level that the Iraqi security forces can manage and give them time to become more proficient. But to work, the military campaign has to be intimately bound up with economic and political progress.
The president’s “benchmarks” for the Iraqi government—sharing oil revenues fairly, spending $10 billion on reconstruction, holding provincial elections, revising the federal constitution and the “de-Baathification” process—are desirable. But they have mostly been heard before, and Mr.. Maliki’s government has failed to achieve them. In any case, big political issues may matter little to gunmen who are often fighting to control the local market, petrol station or street.
